King Gustaf III: The Russian War

1788 - 1790, The Naval War (3b)

The Naval Battle of Vyborg Bay 1790 -

Introduction

A summary of the Russian War of King Gustav III. This naval battle is known as the Vyborg Gauntlet  or the Gauntlet of Vyborg Bay (Swe: Viborgska gatloppet) in Swedish literature. Vyborg is Viborg in Swedish. The war in known as the Russo-Swedish War (1788 - 1790) in English literature During 1790 the Swedes put all their efforts on the naval war. During the winter of 1789/1790 the Swedish Navy and the Galley  Fleet were increased. The Galley Fleet nearly doubled in numbers. In the spring of 1790 the galley fleet counted 349 ships with nearly  3.000 canons and 21,000 men. About 2/3 of the crews were from the Army. The Navy had 21 ships of the line, 8 frigates and 13 smaller ships. In total the navy crews counted 16,300 men. Duke Karl was in charge  of the Navy and King Gustav III was personally in charge of the Galley Fleet. The flag-captain of the Navy was Admiral O H  Nordenskiöld and the flag-captain of the Galley Fleet was colonel George de Frese. On land, the war in 1790 began with a Swedish attack in Savolx and two important gorges were taken on April 15. On the southern  front the Swedes met the Russians in a battle at Valkeala on April 29. However, the Russians started a counter- offensive and forced the  Swedes back across river Kymmene. The Russian advance was stopped at “Keltis baracker” on May 19 and 20. In May 13, 1790 Duke Karl ordered the Swedish Navy to destroy the Russian navy squadron  under Admiral Tjitjagov in the harbor  of Reval  (present day Tallin, a city in Estonia). Unfortunately, when Duke Karl’s launched the assault the weather got really bad with gale force winds. It was almost impossible to use  the guns in the severe weather. The Russian ships were better off anchored within the protected areas of the harbor. They could use  their guns much more effectively.  The weather made it impossible to continue the attack. As a result, the Swedish force had to retreat. Sweden lost 2 ships and 652 men in the battle. 520 of the men lost were actually captured by the Russians. The Russian force only lost  8 dead and 27 wounded. No Russian ships were lost. Two days later, May 15, King Gustav III launched an attack with 100 ships of the Galley Fleet on a squadron of the Russian Galley fleet  in the harbor of Fredrikshamn (Hamina). The Swedish assault was a success and a large number of the Russian vessels were  destroyed. After this achievement King Gustav was ready to make an assault further eastward in the Gulf of Finland. He was now aiming for the  Russian naval base at Kronstadt (an island just outside the Russian capital at the time, St. Petersburg). Admiral Nordenskiöld warned the King about the winds deep in the Gulf of Finland. The gulf stretches in a west/easterly direction. If  the wind changed into an unfavorable direction they could get into trouble. However, the King had the last word. Both the Swedish Navy as well as the Swedish Galley Fleet (the real name of the fleet was the  Army Fleet) were heading eastward towards Kronstadt. Another target was a squadron of the Russian galley fleet that had anchored in the Vyborg Bay, just outside the city of Vyborg.  The Swedish Navy went ahead of the Army fleet and launched two assaults on Kronstadt in June 3 and June 4 1790. A few days after the attack on the Kronstadt naval base the Swedish Navy and the Army Fleet joined up at the mouth of the  Vyborg Bay.  Now the wind changed to a southwesterly wind.  This was exactly what Swedish Admiral Nordenskiöld had warned the King about a few  days earlier. This made it difficult for the Swedish forces to head toward Swedish waters in southeastern regions of Finland. The change of wind also made it impossible for the Swedish Navy to prevent the two Russian navy forces from joining. King Gustav made a decision to take a defensive position a bit further up in the Vyborg Bay and to wait for the winds to once again change. The Navy and the Army Fleet anchored up between the islands of Krysserort and Biskopsö. This was in the beginning of June 1790. In order to better understand this article you might want to read about the two types of fleets Sweden had at this time, The Navy and the Galley Fleet (The Army Fleet) and about the type of ships they were using. See The Navy , The Army Fleet. See also Map of the Gulf of Finland

The Naval Battle of Vyborg Bay 3

July 1790

As described at the Navy page, the heavy, shallow- draught Navy ships were difficult to navigate if the wind didn't come from astern.

The blockade

The wind didn't change and the Swedish naval force were caught in the Vyborg Bay. The Russian navy started a blockade to prevent the Swedes from leaving the bay. The blockade was in effect on June 8th. The blockade itself was not a threat to the two Swedish fleets. On the contrary, the Swedish presence this close to the Russian capital St Petersburg was a threat on Russia and put a strain on the Empress Catharine II. The 400 Swedish ships had an armament of 3.000 guns and a crew of 30.000 sailors and soldiers. The Navy fleet counted 16.000 men and the Army fleet (The Galley flotilla) 14.000. The Navy numbered 21 ships of the line, 13 frigates and a great number of smaller ships. King Gustav III and his brother Grand Admiral Duke Carl were both present on board the Swedish ships. The wind kept blowing in the same direction for a month. After a while, water and food became in short supply on the ships. Meanwhile, the Russians strengthened the blockade. The Russian Admiral Tjitjagov was in command of the blockade. He had at his disposal a fleet of 50 ships including ships of the line, frigates and a number of smaller ships. They were armed with 2.718 guns and the crew numbered 21.000 men. At his disposal were also the Sjlissov's 20 galleys and Admiral Kozlyaninov's 8 archipelago frigates and 52 galleys. However, Admiral Tjitjagov was not prepared to risk his forces by attempting an assault on the Swedish fleet. Instead the Russians anchored up five large ships of the line with its broadsides towards the bay. These ships were chained together. Further out, another five frigates were anchored up. During this month there were a few sea battles between Swedish and Russian units. On June 7th a Swedish army unit was put ashore to do reconnaissance along the roads to St Petersburg (the Russian capital at the time) as well as along the roads to the city of Vyborg. On June 16th King Gustav gave orders to launch an assault on the Russian galley fleet at Trångsund (Uuras, Fin) deep in the Vyborg Bay. The Russian galleys were anchored up just north of the island of Uuraansaari. Three Swedish units, a joint force of ships from the navy and the Army fleet, were sent off to launch the assault. The Center unit was under the command of King Gustav with the assistance of the commander of the gun sloops, Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Tönningen. The Center force numbered 48 ships, including 14 galleys and 4 frigates from the Navy. The Left wing was under the command of Hjelmstierna and the Right wing by Sidney Smith. Both wings consisted of gun sloops and gun tenders. The Center was set off directly to Trångsund while the wings were to attack from each side. Due to bad weather, neither the Center nor the Left wing could attack on June 16th or on June 17th. However, Smith launched an attack on June 16th with the Right wing. His unit of 38 gun sloops was under fire from a Russian battery but he managed to neutralize the battery. He was also attacked by the Russian galleys, which he also managed to fend off. Smith continued the attack on June 17th but finally had to retire due to the lack of support from the Center and the Left wing. On June 18th the assault was cancelled and the force returned. Another battle was held at Björkösund (The Björkö sound) on July 2nd when a Swedish reconnaissance force met up with a Russian unit under the command of Nassau. The Swedes managed to stop Nassau from advancing and Nassau lost a frigate and an schebeck.

Strategy for a breakout

King Gustav realized that he couldn't stay much longer in the Vyborg Bay. So, on June 19th the King directed admiral Nordenskiöld to develop a plan for breaking through the Russian blockade. The plan was to break out as soon as the winds changed to a favorable direction. Tönning was given the task of creating a diversion with his gun sloops (kanonslupar) just prior to the real breakout. The diversion was to be launched towards the Russian ships at Vasikansaari, west of the island of Björkö. It was hoped that the Russians would believe that this was where the Swedes were trying to break through the blockade. The real breakout was to be launched from Krysserort.

The Russian locks

There are two major channels out of the Vyborg Bay, the eastern channel through the Björkö sound and the western channel at Krysserort. The western channel was sealed off at two places by Russian units. The first lock was east of Krysserort, between Krysserort and the Repiegrund (The Repie shallows) and consisted of 5 ships of the line and a bombardment ship of Admiral Illarion Povalisjin's squadron. The second lock was a bit further southward between the island of “Lilla Fiskarna” and Penserholmarna (The Pensar islets) and consisted of 5 frigates and a bombardment ship (bombfartyg). Rear Admiral Pyotr Khanykov commanded three of the frigates and two were under the command of the British Admiral Roman Crown (in Russian service). Crown's own ship was the former Swedish frigate "Venus". The ships were anchored up in a line stretching from east to west. A bit further westward at Pitkäpaasi were three frigates and two smaller vessels holding a position. The channel was very difficult to navigate with a lot of shallows. The eastern channel were much more narrow and blockaded by four Russian ships of the line and a bombardment ship under the command of Major General Pyotr Lezhnev.

The Breakout, 3 July 1790

On July 2 the wind finally shifted. Now a northerly wind, which made an breakout possible. The supreme command of the fleet had a meeting. Orders for the breakout were given during the night of July 3, 1790. At 02.00 (2 AM) the Swedish units opened fire on the Russian shore batteries. At the same time Tönningen launched a diversion with his gun sloops and attacked a Russian unit left of the island of Vasikansaari, left of Björkö. The real outbreak was set of at 07.00 (7 AM). The Swedish breakout from Vyborg Bay (The Naval Battle of Vyborg Bay) is known in Sweden as "The Viborgska gatloppet" (English: The Vyborg Gauntlet). The Swedish Navy: First out in the line of Swedish Navy ships was the 64-gun ship of the line "The Dristigheten" (The Daring). The captain of The Dristigheten was Lieutenant Colonel Johan af Puke (his name has nothing to do with the English meaning of this word). Just before the breakout, King Gustav reminded him of Puke's father's loyalty to the Crown and now appealed to the son to show the same courage and self-sacrificing spirit. Johan af Puke answered the King "Yes, Your Majesty, You bet your bloody life I will get through, but for the rest of the ships, I don't know".

Explanations to the map above

The Navy took a direct course in the channel out of the bay. The Army fleet was instructed to go west of the Navy, a bit closer to the shore. Their course was parallel to the Navy course and on the protective side of the Navy ships. "The Dristigheten" takes the lead of the Swedish Navy ships and first steers on a northerly course to get around the Salvors shallows (Salvorsgrunden, swe; Kulta matala, Fin). Then she navigated in the middle of the channel between the shallows and Krysserort and sets off in a southwesterly direction. Behind "The Dristighten" was her sister ship, "The tapperheten" (The Bravery) followed by the rest of the ships of line and the Navy frigates. As Lieutenant Colonel Puke on "The Dristigheten" sailed closer to the first Russian lock he set a course directly between two of the Russian ships in the lock, the ships of line "The Selsav" (74-guns) and "The Sviatnoj Pjotr" (The Saint Peter). The first lock had 5 ships of the line with its broadsides towards the approaching Swedish fleet. It must have been quite scary for the sailors onboard the five Russian ships to see the entire Swedish fleet of 400 ships and 3.000 guns heading for them. One of the Russian ships was hit by a number of broadsides from "The Dristigheten" and was literary torn a part. More than 700 Russians were killed. Puke had ordered all men, not needed on deck, below deck and therefore had no causalities. The two Russian ships were also badly hit by the fire from "The Tapperheten". The image to the right is showing the Swedish Navy’s breakout of Vyborg Bay through the first Russian lock on July 3, 1790. The Dristigheten is lead of the Swedish ships. The Swedish ships are the ones with the yellow and blue flags. The image is a photograph of an oil painting made in 2016 by Kjell Johansson, Skåne, Sweden. The image is shown with consent of Kjell Johansson. The Swedish flagship "The Konung Gustaf III" (The King Gustaf III) was in the middle of the line of Swedish navy ships. At the end of the line there were the frigate "The Zemire" and the 70-gun ship of the line "The Enigheten" (The Unity) plus three fire barges (brännare). The fire barges were barges with a bon fire which was used in sea battles to set fire to enemy ships. The King was aboard "The Seraphimerorden" but left the ship before reaching the first lock. The King then embarked on a smaller sloop that was rowed through the line of fire. After they had passed the lock the King reboarded "The Seraphimerorden". Duke Karl was aboard the flagship "The Konung Gustaf III". She took some fire and the Duke himself was slightly injured. The Army flotilla was proceeding west of the Navy ships, closer to the shore. At the first lock the Army ships were protected on one side (on their flank) by the Swedish Navy ships The difficulty for the Army fleet was the second lock. Here they had to face five Russian frigates ordered in a line stretching from the shore out into the channel, just north of the island "Lilla Fiskaren". Commander on the Russian frigate "The Nietroch Menja" was James Trevenen. The first ship in the line of Swedish Army fleet was the Hemmeman class frigate "Styrbjörn" under command of Lieutenant Colonel Victor von Stedingks. The Turuman class frigate "Norden", under command of Captain Olander and then the rest of the turuma squadron of 6 ships followed "The Styrbjörn". "The Sällan Värre" and the rest of the archipelago frigates were next in line. The Malmberg's, the Hjelmstierna's and the Tönning's squadrons of gun sloops, gun tenders and gun sloops made up the rearguard. "The Styrbjörn" had set full sails and though under heavy fire made it through the lock. She scored several hits with her gun fire on the Russian Commander Povalisjin’s ship and a bombardment ship, "The Pobjäditel" at the first lock. The Swedish galleys "The Ehrenpreuss", "The Palmstierna ", "The Ekeblad " and "The Uppland" went aground at the Pensar islet (Pensarholmarna), close to the Russian ship "The Nietroch Menja" and had to strike the flag. This was near the second lock. The reason these ships ran aground was that it became more or less impossible to accurately navigate in the heavy gun smoke and the smoke from burning ships. The channel was full of dangerous shallows.

The explosion

The breakout started off very well. However at 10.00 hours (10 AM) in the morning a series of accidents occurred that influenced the remainder of the breakout. There were three fire barges at the rearguard of the Navy line. They were loaded with tar and aboard each of them was a commanding officer with a burning torch. The fire barges were supposed to be used to set fire to Povalisjin's ships. One of the fire barges, "The Postiljonen" (The Maliman), was towed by the ship of line "The Enigheten". Commanding officer onboard "The Postiljonen" was Ensign Sandels. Sandels had taken one too many drinks before the battle and set fire to his fire barge too early. "The Postiljonen" then drifted towards "The Enigheten" and set her on fire. "The Enigheten" then collided with the frigate "The Zemire". Both ships caught fire and exploded with an enormous cascade. Smoke from the two ships on fire was soon covering the entire channel. It became very difficult for the Swedish ships to navigate in the dangerous channel after the explosion due to the dense smoke. At this time, the first part of both the Navy ships and the ships of the Army fleet had made it through the locks of the blockade. The commanders of these ships thought the explosion came from the Povalisjin's Russian ships in the first lock. Not until several hours later did they learn the real reason for the explosion. King Gustav's adviser, the British Sidney Smith, had been saved from “The Auroras” shipwreck. The King's personal ship, “The Amphion” made it through without any damage. The Swedish 64-gun ship of the line, “The Hedvig Elisabeth Charlotta” ran aground in the heavy smoke. Her Captain was the experienced Hindric Johan Nauckhoff. While aground he still let the ship guns fire at the Russian frigates until the end. The 56-gun ship of the line, “The Finland” ran aground at the Salvors shallows. That happened before the explosion though. The 74-gun ship of the line, “The Lovisa Ulrika” ran aground at the Passaloda shallows, just south of Reipie. At this place other Swedish ship ran aground, the frigate “The Uppland” and “The Jarrislawitz”, a frigate captured from the Russians in 1788. The 64-gun ship of the line, “The Ömheten” (The Tenderness) ran aground at the Pensar islets. In total 4 ships of the line and two frigates run aground due to the dense smoke from the fire of the two ships that exploded.

The shallows

Close to Krysserort there are the two-mile long Salvors shallows (Kulta matala, Fin). A bit further south, just east of the channel is the Repie shallows and the Passaloda shallows, which really make the passage in the channel between Krysserort and the island “Lilla Fiskaren” very narrow. Close to Pensar islet is another shallow. The whole of Europe was following the events and the outcome of the affair in the Vyborg Bay with a tense expectation. Despite the losses of ships, the breakout was a Swedish success. The objective of King Gustav III was to get as many ships out of the bay in one piece and save the Swedish Navy and the Army fleet. The Russian objective on the other hand was to trap the Swedish fleets and to destroy them. So the Russians failed in their objective since the Swedes managed to save their fleet. A failure to break out would have been a disaster to Sweden. In total the Swedish Navy lost 5 ships of the line, 3 frigates and about 38 smaller vessels. About 4.000 Swedes were lost. The Swedish Army fleet was better off, all of the Archipelago frigates, for example, made it through the blockade. The ships that passed the Russian locks before the unfortunate explosion only took minor damage on their way out. The Russian ships at the locks, close to the Swedish passages, were more or less blown to pieces by the gunfire from the passing ships of the line. Roughly half of all the Swedish ships had made it through before the explosion. Remarkably, none of the Swedish ships was lost due to Russian gun fire. All of the lost ships ran aground due to the poor visibility caused by the smoke from all the fires. So it was not the Russians that directly caused the losses of Swedish ships. After the breakout the Swedish ships were assembled at Vidskär (The Vidskär skerry) in the Gulf of Finland, just south of Pitkäpaasi. Then the Swedish Navy set sail and headed for the Swedish naval base at the fortress of Sveaborg just outside Helsinki in the southwestern part of Finland to do repairs. The Army fleet also headed westward but took a course closer to the shores of Finland where they were more protected from rough sea and from the Russian navy. The destination for the Army fleet was Svensksund just outside Kotka where they took up a defensive position. The Russians were late in starting their pursuit. They followed the Swedish Navy all the way to Sveaborg from quite a distance. A few days later the Russian Galley fleet followed the Swedish Army fleet westward. The Sea Battle at Svensksund 1790 A couple of days later (June 9th – 10th) the Swedish Army fleet and the Russian Galley fleet were involved in a very bloody sea battle at Svensksund where more or less the entire Russian galley fleet was destroyed. This is one of the greatest naval victories in all of Swedish history and the largest sea battle that ever had occurred in the Baltic Sea.

Names of places in this region

It is difficult to refer to names of places in this region since it has belonged to both Sweden and Russia. Today some of these places belong to Finland. Finland was Swedish territory until 1809. The province of Ingermanland in the western part of Russia belonged to Sweden between about 1570 and 1721. Both the city of Vyborg and the city of St Petersburg are in this area. Also the Baltic region, which is today's Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, belonged to Sweden until 1721. Since Sweden controlled this region for so many years all the places have Swedish names. All references in Swedish historic material, old maps etc. refer to places by their Swedish names. Some places have both Swedish and Finish names. The areas that today belong to Russia have of course Russian names nowadays. Islands in the border area between Finland and Russia have both Finnish and Russian names. In most cases we actually have three names of places in this region, Swedish, Finnish and Russian names. Therefore there is a problem to refer to places in this area. To make it even more difficult, since this article is in English, which names are used in English? In this article I have first of all used the Swedish names. Example: The city of Vyborg is called Viborg in Swedish.

Related Links

• Swedish Wars • The Swedish - Russian war of 1788 - 1790 • The naval battle of Vyborg Bay 1790 • The naval battle of Svensksund 1790 • The Allotment System • Swedish Regiments • Uniforms of the Swedish Army • The Swedish Navy  • The Swedish Army Fleet (Galley Fleet) Top of page

Source References

• 1. Historien om Sverige, När Sverige blev stormakt. Herman Lindqvist, 1997 • 2. Om sjökriget, från Svensksund till smygteknik. Marco Smedberg, 1996 • 3. Svensksund, Gustaf III:s krig och skärgårdsflottan 1788 - 1790. Stig Jägerskiöld, 1990 • 4. Försvarets civilförvaltning 1634 - 1865. 1994 • 5. Det gotländska båtsmanshållet 1646 - 1887. Kjell Olson, 1993 • 6. Skärgårdsflottan. Hans Norman (red), 2000