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Swedish Volunteer Corps in

Finland - The Battles

The Swedish Volunteer Corps (SVC) was involved in many battles with the Russian forces in Märkäjärvi after the Swedes took over the front sector from the Finns. Below is a selection of battles or combats the SVC was involved in:

Lieutenant Colonel Magnus Dyrssen - Killed

in Action on 1 March 1940

On 1 March 1940, the Commander of the I. Battlegroup, Lieutenant Colonel Magnus Dyrssen, was reviewing the Corps defense area, fieldwork, fire positions, etc. The Swedes were that day bothered by Russian air raids. At 15:00, Russian artillery batteries opened fire onto the position of the I. Battlegroup. Lieutenant Colonel Dyrssen was hit by a piece of shrapnel and died. Senior Company Commander of the I. Battlegroup, Captain Carl C:son Bonde, took over the Command of the battlegroup.

The Ranger Company’s Combat on 2 March

1940

On 1 March 1940, the Ranger Company with the II. Battlegroup received an order to execute a three- day-long reconnaissance commission behind the Russian lines in Märkäjärvi. The objective was to explore the land and to find a possible line of approach for a northern attack on the Russian positions in Märkäjärvi. Commander of the Ranger Company was Lieutenant Anders Grafström. The company consisted of 168 army rangers, however, only 93 rangers were selected for the mission since one of the platoons been on an exhausting reconnaissance and surveillance commission during the previous night and needed a recovery. Ammunition, a communication radio, two squad tents with stoves (each tent had room for 25 soldiers), and vacuum-packed provisions were packed in two one-man pulled sleds, which the rangers took turns to pull. Further, two more sleds were brought for the transportation of wounded rangers, if any. Under the cover of darkness, the Ranger Company departed at 17:00 (5:00 PM) on skis. The temperature was then -20 degrees C (-4 F). The company took a wide circular route west of the Russian positions and entered behind the Russian defense line from the north. After a nine-hour exhausting ski march, with only short breaks, the company pitched a camp in total darkness in a forested area close to the Russian lines. Guards were posted in all directions and the two squad tents were pitched for a few hours of sleep with 35 - 40 rangers per tent. Food was heated for energy. Early, at 3:00 in the morning, still dark, reconnaissance patrols were sent out to determine their present situation. The patrols returned with valuable information about the Russian positions, type of units, activities, etc. The image to the right shows a Swedish reconnaissance ski-patrol in Finland during the Winter War. At first light, the Swedes found out that they, in the darkness of night, had pitched their camp in a larger grove surrounded by open country. One patrol got into trouble: One of the patrols, consisting of nine men under the command of Second Lieutenant Torbjörn Öjstad, ended up in a Russian ambush with some 60 Russians. The rangers in the patrol were exhausted after the tiring night and Second Lieutenant Öjstad, against rules, decided to return to the company’s camp in the own ski tracks, which was less exhausting than skiing in the deep snow. This turned out to be a fatal mistake. However, two rangers made a protest and they took another way back, which saved their lives; they were First Sergeant Åke Edsbo and private Jonas Johansson. The remaining seven rangers in the patrol skied used their old ski tracks and ended later in an ambush where 60 Russians lay in wait. In the hour- long losing combat following, Second Lieutenant Öjstad, Sergeant Bror Sixten Jansson, and private Linus Johansson were killed. The remaining four rangers, of which two were wounded, were taken prisoners of war. One of the wounded Swedes, Sergeant Per-Gustaf Carlsson, died a few hours later. The two in the patrol that took another route managed to get back to the company camp without any contact with Russians. The three Swedish POWs survived the Russian captivity and were able to return to Sweden in May 1940, after the Winter War; they were First Sergeant Nils Wikström, Sergeant Torsten Jonsson, and private Uno Bengtsson. The fallen Swedes in the ambush weren’t found until August 1940, i.e. after the war, by First Sergeant Wikström. The Russian soldiers had rigged mines around the killed Swedes, so-called booby-traps. The ranger’s combat in the Grove on 2 March: Around 13:00 on 2 March, a Russian force of 60 soldiers on skis approached the grove where the ranger’s base was. The Russians discovered the Swedish entering ski track into the grove, which was on the north side of the grove, and then advanced towards the grove. The Swedes opened fire and long combat broke out. Yet another troop of 70 men joined the Russian force and the new troop attacked the Swedes from the south. However, the Swedish rangers had a very good defensive position in the slightly elevated grove and managed to repel the Russian attacks and the Russians suffered from great losses. The rangers also had wounded soldiers and casualties. The Russian force received reinforcements and their force counted 400 men after a while. However, it was difficult for the Russians to fire from prone positions in the deep snow and their firing was often too highly aimed. The Russian attempts to conquer the grove came to a halt around 14:30 (2:30 PM). Around 15:00 yet another troop of 50 - 60 Russians arrived and at 16:30 another 150 men. The Russians regrouped for attacks from both the west and the south. The Swedish rangers made several attempts to contact their headquarters but the radio wasn’t functional in the cold weather. The Swedes were getting ready for the final Russian charge which was initiated at 18:00. The main Russian charge came from the south. The Swedish machine guns caused severe Russian losses. A Swedish violent counter-attack, commanded by Lieutenant Sven Grape, developed into close quarter combat which went on into the Russian assembly area. The counter-attack was very successful and the Russian unit was wiped out. It was estimated that the Russians lost between 100 and 200 men in the battle. The Swedish company lost six rangers in the battle and several rangers were wounded. The killed Swedes were: First Sergeant Evald Hjukström, First Sergeant Gunnar Hörnqvist, First Sergeant Olof Svensson-Myhr, Sergeant Helge Wallman, private Jonas Johansson, and private Algot Palm. Under the cover of darkness, the Swedish rangers then made an eastward breakout from their base in the grove since this direction was where the Russian was weakest. The severely wounded Rangers were put in the sleds while the lightly wounded were capable to ski. Captured Russian weapons were also brought forth. However, the six fallen rangers had to be left behind in the grove as well as the tents. The breakout was successful. The Swedes had taken six Russian POWs during the battle. During the ski march back to the Swedish lines the Russians were incapable of keeping up with the rangers why they had to be eliminated. The order of the ski march was: vanguard, company HQ, sleds’ with the wounded and Russian weapons, and the rearguard. After about 1 km skiing eastward, the rangers turned north. Then, after a while, they turned westward and rounded the Russians and skied on a circular route back to the Swedish lines. The rangers stopped for a break after 7 hours to have some hot food and water. This was their first meal for 19 hours in the -30 C (-22 F) cold weather. The image to the right shows the Commander of the Ranger Company, II. Battlegroup, Lieutenant Anders Grafström, (to the left) talking to Lieutenant Sven Grape (left arm in a sling). Photo: Krigsarkivet. The rangers arrived at the Swedish lines without any further encounter with Russians at 09:00 on 3 March. The rearguard, under the command of Sergeant Tall von Post, didn’t return at the Swedish lines until afternoon the following day, after a night in the open air. On 20 March, i.e. after the end of the war, the company skied to the grove to fetch the fallen rangers. The ranger’s mission and battle behind the Russian lines are known as the “The Grafström Raid”.

Above, a map of the Ranger Company’s raid behind enemy lines on 1 - 3 March 1940 with my notes in color. Image source: The book "För Finlands frihet: Svenska frivilligkåren 1939-1940 (von Schmidt- Laussitz)" and shown with the consent of the author.

The Ranger Company, I. Battlegroup –

Second Lieutenant Jervant’s Reconnaissance

Patrol 6 - 7 March

After Lieutenant Grafström’s reconnaissance for a line of approach for a northern attack of the Russian positions in Märkäjärvi, there was also a need to find out the possibilities for a southern line of approach. A platoon from the Ranger Company with the I. Battlegroup received an order on 6 March for such a mission. The reconnaissance patrol consisted of 30 rangers under the command of Second Lieutenant Arne Jervant. The platoon departed on skis at 21:00 on 6 March 1940 under the cover of darkness and was instructed to be back around 24:00 on 7 March. The temperature was then -20 degrees C (-4 F). An hour before the patrol was leaving, Second Lieutenant Jervant received information that Lieutenant Melcher Wernstedt was joining the patrol. Lieutenant Wernstedt was an HQ adjutant who had volunteered to join the patrol for the purpose of study without any power of command. During the night on 7 March, the patrol approached the frozen Lake Pyhäjärvi. They entered the ice and followed the lake’s western side in a northerly direction. At dawn, they left the northern shore and entered into bushland where they were less exposed. The patrol was then challenged by a Russian sentry, close to the Swede’s present location. In front of the patrol were rangers Carl-Erik Winlöf and Bror Strandkvist. Both prepared to open fire at the Russian sentry when they were stopped by Lieutenant Wernstedt for some reason. The Russian sentry was, therefore, able to open fire before the Swedes. In the firing private Winlöf was badly wounded in his thigh, probably by an explosive bullet. The Russian sentry was shot by First Sergeant Gösta Borg. The patrol withdrew a few hundred meters to get out of range and a medic was able to examine Winlöf’s wound. However, he was losing blood very fast and the medic reported that Winlöf would bleed to death if he wasn’t treated by a surgeon within a few hours. The patrol hadn’t brought any sleds which meant it would be very difficult to carry Winlöf back to their own lines before he died. Besides, he was getting weaker by the minute. The rangers tried to makeshift a stretcher with connected skis, without succeeding. Winlöf urged the rangers to leave him and reach safety. The commander of the patrol, Second Lieutenant Jervant ordered the patrol to withdraw a few kilometers towards the road. Jervant and Lieutenant Wernstedt stayed with Winlöf until a Russian unit advanced towards them and opened fire. Jervant gave the order to withdraw. However, Wernstedt didn’t follow the order and stayed with private Winlöf. What really happened thereafter was for a long time unknown. Unfortunately for the SVC, Wernstedt had, against given orders, brought a map of the Swedish positions in Märkäjärvi, that now fell into the hands of the Russians. All this coincided with the report Second Lieutenant Jervant made after the mission the same evening. The image to the right shows Second Lieutenant Jervant (in white) with a few of the army rangers in his platoon. Jervant managed to get back to his ranger patrol without any further incidents. They were still behind enemy lines and a large Russian unit was advancing towards them, so Jervant estimated that they would have very little chance of proceeding with their mission. The patrol, therefore, aborted the mission and returned to their own lines. It was later shown that Lieutenant Wernstedt deliberately stayed with private Winlöf facing the consequences of his act when he prevented Winlöf from opening fire at the Rusian sentry and thereby indirectly caused Winlöf mortal wound. On 19 March, i.e. a few days after the end of the war, the Rangers searched for the bodies of Wernstedt and Winlöf in the area where the patrol’s combat with the Russians stood. Both bodies were found, stripped of all clothes except the underwear. It seems like Lieutenant Wernstedt had ended dying Winlöf’s life and then taken his own life to avoid being captured by the Russians. Both were shot in the head. A diary, written by one of the participating rangers, states that there had been conflicts between Wernstedt and Jervant during the reconnaissance mission. They had argued about the route chosen and Wernstedt had interfered in Jervant’s exercise of command although Wernstedt had no power of command in the patrol. There is also a notation in the diary stating that the rangers, when they were withdrawing from the area, heard two gunshots.

Above, a map showing the route chosen by the Ranger patrol on 6 - 7 March 1940 with my own notes in color. Image source: The book "För Finlands frihet: Svenska frivilligkåren 1939-1940 (von Schmidt- Laussitz)" and shown with the consent of the author.

The Combat on the Ristelivaara Hill, 8 March

The situation in front of the Swedish Volunteer Corps southern flank wasn’t satisfactory. The area was controlled by the Russians via a surveillance unit on top of the Ristelivaara Hill’s northern summit, nicknamed “Kalotten” (The skull-cap). From the summit, the Russians had a full view of the area south of the I. Battlegroup’s right flank and were able to monitor everything that happened in this area. The Russians also had an artillery fire control station on the summit where forward fire controllers were able to direct their artillery fire at targets in the low-laying terrain nearby the Swedish positions. To launch an attack on the Russian positions in Märkäjärvi from a southern direction, the Swedes first had to eliminate the Russian observation spot on the summit. The Finnish units had previously tried to conquer the hill without succeeding. The Swedish Corps HQ decided to attack and eliminate the Russian observation spot on the summit with Lieutenant Grafström’s Ranger Company, I. Battlegroup, and the 3rd Rifle Company with the II. Battlegroup under the command of Captain Herbert Ling-Vannerus. After midnight on 8 March, a reconnaissance platoon under the command of Lieutenant Gustav Söderblom was sent out to monitor the Russian positions and fortifications on the hill. The platoon was composed of soldiers from the 3rd Rifle Company, II. Battlegroup. The platoon, which consisted of three squads, approached the Ristelivaara Hill from the north. Two squads skied on a ski track previously made over the Uuravaara Hill down to the bottom of the Ristelivaara Hill. The third squad, under the command of Sergeant Jonsson, skied on a route between Märkävaara and Uuravaara to find out if any Russian patrol activities had been going on in the area during the last 24 hours. They spotted ski tracks between the Russian positions in Märkävaara and Ristelivaara which showed that the Russians had been frequently used these tracks. The three Swedish squads converged at the bottom of the Ristelivaara Hill’s north side. Two squads were to secure the area by the Russian ski track and act as a reserve while a third squad under the command of Sergeant Carl Anders Jonsson and six men were going to advance to the top of Ristelivaara Hill to locate the Russian unit at the observation spot. The squad began the ascent to the top of the hill around 7:00 in the morning. They were facing daylight halfway up on the hill. During their ascent, they received orders to engage the Russian unit. When the squad approached the summit they were dazzled by the rising sun. Therefore they had to move to the side to get away from the bright sun. The final approach to the summit had to be done in open terrain. At 7:30, the squad was spotted by the Russian sentries and was intensely fired at, from three different fire positions. Private Per-Johan Lindh was badly wounded by an explosive bullet that tore his right forearm to pieces. Sergeant Carl Anders Jonsson managed to sweep the closest Russian fire position with his sub-machine- gun which gave the Swedes breathing space. That gave private Johan Bergman time to get into a firing position with his light machine gun and open supporting fire. Thereby were the other four soldiers in the squad able to advance and secure their fellow squad members retreat. Private Jan Henrik Thegerstöm was then hit by a Russian bullet and fell. However, private Oskar Inge Fors managed, despite the heavy Russian fire, to crawl up to Thegerstöm but could only state that he was already dead. The open terrain and the heavy Russian firing made it impossible to launch a counter-attack and the squad was forced to retreat. They were forced to leave Thegerstöm’s dead body behind but it was fetched a week later after the cease-fire on 13 March. The image to the right shows the typical hilly country in the Märkäjärvi area. Photo: Krigsarkivet. After the combat, Captain Herbert Ling-Vannerus recommended a distinction to Sergeant Carl Anders Jonsson and private Per-Johan Lindh for shown great bravery and resolution during the combat. Later on the same day, Colonel Nordenswan briefed the commanders of the I. and II. battlegroups that larger attack on the Russian position on the Ristelivaara Hill was to be launched early morning on 11 March and that they were to prepare the two battlegroups for such an attack.

The Russian Attack on 10 March

On 10 March, the preparations for an attack on the Russian observation spot on the top of the Ristelivaara Hill were in full progress, which was to be launched early morning following day. Reconnaissance had shown that the Russian unit on the summit numbered about 10 men and that there were further units, with an unknown force, nearby the hill. The Swedish units that were going to carry out the attack were ordered to deploy at their restrictive final assault positions at 04:30 in the morning of the following day. The assault was set off with artillery fire at the observation spot on the summit. However, the assault was never carried out on 11 March, since the Russians launched an attack on the Swedish positions in Märkäjärvi in the afternoon of 10 March. At 14:15 on 10 March, the machine gun troop, 2nd Rifle Company, II. Battlegroup, gave the alert signal about an imminent Russian assault at the Rifle Company’s right flank. The Swedish units were immediately ordered to their battle positions. When a smaller Russian unit advanced to about 100 meters from the hindrance line the machine gun troop opened fire and the Russian assault came to a standstill. At 15:00, a larger Russian unit was inserted in the combat and the assault was intensified. However, the Swedes repelled also this assault. At 17:00, a new Russian assault was launched, this time with covering fire from artillery pieces and mortars, at this sector of the front. The Swedish mortar troops had their registration spots for the firing and when they opened fire at the advancing Russians it had a very good firing effect. At 20:15, a platoon of army rangers, II. Battlegroup, was sent out to make a counter-attack at the Russian right flank which they carried out at 22:00 under the cover of darkness. Fifteen minutes later, a Swedish reconnaissance ski patrol was sent out to establish whether the Russians remained in the terrain in front of the Swedish positions. The patrol returned at midnight and was able to report that the Russians had withdrawn. During the battle, 46 Russians were killed or wounded and they had been left behind to die in the -40 degree C (-40 F) cold weather when the Russian force withdrew. In the daylight of the following day, tracks of blood showed that several wounded Russian soldiers had been dragged back to the Russian lines too. At 04:00, the Swedes sent out patrols with sleds to gather the weapons left behind by the Russians when they withdrew, which was a lot. In the morning on 11 March, reports arrived from the Finnish Salla Battalion about a new Russian unit around the Ristelivaara Hill. The Salla battalion was deployed near the Pyhätunturi Hill, i.e. south of the Russian lines, east of the Ristelivaara Hill. The Swedish Volunteer Corps sent out several reconnaissance patrols to find out more about the new Russian unit’s activities. The patrols didn’t find any unusual activities in the area. However, the patrols were able to confirm that the former Russian units had been relieved by new ones. The Corps Headquarters reported on 11 March that the 1st Rifle Company with the III. Battlegroup, under the command of Captain Victor Ancarcrona, was arriving in Märkäjärvi during the upcoming night. This was the first unit with the III. Battlegroup to arrive at the front sector. The I. and II. battlegroups had been at the front since 26 February. It had taken a much longer time to form the III. Battlegroup. One reason was that the two battlegroups at the front constantly picked men from the III. Battlegroup to fill their gaps in the ranks. The remaining units with the III. battlegroup was planned to arrive at the front during the nights of 13 – 14 March and 14 – 15 March. At noon on 12 March, reports arrived from the I. Artillery Battery’s observation spot on the top of the Hatajavaara Hill that 10 to 15 Russian tanks been observed east of Märkäjärvi, heading towards Märkäjärvi. The Russians were obviously up to something. On 12 March, there was a change of command of the I. battlegroup. Lieutenant Colonel Carl-Oscar Agell then replaced Captain Carl Bonde, who until now had been acting commander of the battlegroup. On 12 March, the 16th Independent Ranger Company under the command of Captain Gösta Wetterhall arrived at the front. Another unit that arrived that day was the 2nd Anti-tank Platoon. Also, on 12 March, the Russian artillery batteries showered the I. Battlegroup’s advanced defense line on the Paikanselkä Hill with shells. The I. Battlegroup’s Ranger Company was deployed on the hill. On the evening of 12 March, a Russian unit of at least 50 soldiers advanced towards the 2nd Rifle Company’s left flank and an exchange of fire occurred. At 18:45, there were also reports from the 3rd Rifle Company, II. Battlegroup, which was deployed south of the Hatajavaara Hill, i.e. south of the I. Battlegroup’s positions, that a strong enemy force was advancing from a southerly direction. The 3rd Rifle Company opened fire. The Ranger Company with the I. Battlegroup was sent down to the area to reconnoiter and to establish whether it was a Russian advance or just a short engagement. It was - 30 C (-22 F) and a moonlight night. Once in the designated area, the ranger company sent out three reconnaissance patrols to watch out for Russian units. At midnight, the rangers sent a report that the area was quiet and that the Russians had returned to their lines. Late in the evening on 12 March, the I. Battlegroup received orders to send out squads to capture Russian soldiers to establish which type of Russian units that now was in the area. The II. Battlegroup was ordered to carry out reconnaissance in the area north of the Russian positions in Märkäjärvi. Further, the battlegroup was to make it difficult for Russian reconnaissance patrols and disturb the traffic on the road east of Märkäjärvi and capture Russians to establish the type of units. The 16th Independent Ranger Company was sent out on a similar mission. A Russian unit was detected by the patrols in the sector in front of the I. Battlegroup’s positions and the battlegroup was ordered on combat alert.

The Last Battle - The morning of 13 March

On 12 March 1940, Finland and the Soviet Union signed a Peace Treaty in Moscow which ended the Winter War with a cease-fire at 11:00 on 13 March (Helsinki time). The Headquarters with the Swedish Volunteer Corps received information in the early morning of 13 March about the peace treaty with a cease-fire in effect from 11:00. The HQ wasn’t able, at that time, to get the information confirmed, so only the high ranked Commanders of the two battlegroups were informed. The units were briefed at 10:30 about the imminent armistice. The Russian units at the Märkäjärvi front ought to have received similar information that morning from their HQ. However, around 6:00 in the morning, 13 March, the Russians launched a fierce firing at the Swedish lines in Märkäjärvi with machine guns, artillery, mortars, and bombers. The showering of the Swedish lines went on without any breaks for 5 hours. The Russian firing was repelled by the Swedish artillery pieces and infantry mortars and at least one Russian battery was eliminated. The air raids were battled with automatic anti-aircraft guns and anti- aircraft machine guns. Although the intensity, the Russian firing wasn’t causing too many damages. The deep snow effectively cushioned the shocks of the points of impact and the bursts. The Russian firing stopped at 11:11. During these last hours of the Winter War, 10 soldiers with the Swedish Volunteer Corps were killed and 30 were wounded. The image to the right shows the point of impact of a Russian shell in the deep snow at the Märkäjärvi front sector on 13 March. Photo: Krigsarkivet. Since the Commanders of the Swedish Volunteer Corps in the early morning of 13 March knew about the cease-fire at 11:00, also the Russian Commanders at the Märkäjärvi front ought to have received the same type of information. After all, they stopped the firing just after 11:00. So, why did they launch the fierce firing at the Swedish lines just a few hours before the cease-fire took effect? Did they want to use up all their remaining ammunition or did they want to cause as much damage as possible before the armistice? After the cease-fire, the Russian units were supposed to withdraw from Finnish territory according to the peace treaty. However, this took many days, a longer time than agreed. The Swedish Volunteer Corps, therefore, remained in their positions, with surveillance, and the monitoring of the Russian withdrawal as long as there were Russian units in the area. On 23 March, all the Russian units were withdrawn. On 16 March, the SVC HQ received an order from the Headquarters of the Finnish Armed Forces that the Swedish Volunteer Corps was to be disbanded. Early on 16 March, Lieutenant Colonel Agell received a message that a few Russian officers with a flag of truce (white flag) had arrived in front of the I. Battlegroup’s positions. Lt. Col. Agell met the Russians together with two adjutants. The Russian officer’s aimed to hand over detailed maps with the locations of their mined zones to avoid losses when Finnish units took over the area. However, the Russians refused to hand over the maps to Lt. Col. Agell since he wasn’t a Finnish officer but a Swedish. The Finnish Salla Battalion was still in the area and the Battalion Commander was sent for. The Commander was ill so he sent his Second in Command, Lieutenant Kiiveri, who arrived a few hours later. On the same day, 16 March, the Russians fetched their fallen soldiers in front of the Swedish positions, soldiers that fell during their assault on the Swedish lines on 10 March.

Memorial Service for the Fallen Soldiers

On 17 March, the Swedish Volunteer Corps held a Memorial Service for the fallen soldiers. The Corps had 38 killed and about 50 wounded. In addition, there were more than 130 frost damaged soldiers in the arctic cold. Listing of the fallen soldiers.

Finnish Field Marshal Mannerheim thanked

the Swedish Volunteer Corps on 26 March

At 11:00, 26 March 1940, the Finnish Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Gustaf Mannerheim (1867 - 1951), officially thanked the members of the Swedish Volunteer Corps in a ceremony in Paikanselkä, just north of the former front-line. At the ceremony, the Field Marshal promoted many of the Swedes. Further, several volunteers were awarded the Finnish Order of the Cross of Liberty and other medals of distinction. Since all Swedish units weren’t able to participate in the ceremony in Paikanselkä, ceremonies were also held in Kemi and Joutsijärvi for the personnel of the Swedish Volunteer Corps.

Demobilization

In the morning of 27 March, the disestablishment of the Corps commenced, all bivouacs were broken up and packed in the baggage. Stock-taking of all the equipment was done. According to an order from the Headquarter of the Finnish Armed Forces, the SVC officers’ and soldiers’ service contract with the Finnish Government would be canceled as of 30 April. The volunteers were to be demobilized unit by unit, in an order settled by the Commander of SVC. The volunteers were allowed to keep their uniforms but their military weapons had to be handed in before demobilization. For those volunteers that wished to remain in the service of the Finnish Armed Forces, the possibility existed. The disestablishment and the demobilization took some time. The first contingent of demobilized volunteers arrived in Sweden on 31 March. The last of the volunteers didn’t arrive in Sweden until 26 April.